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IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF THE AMICI
This brief is submitted pursuant to Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure and the Court’s November 12, 2014 Order. All
parties consented to the filing of this brief.
Amici are Internet law professors and scholars who regularly
teach and write about online immunities and safe harbors for usergenerated content websites. Amici write to express their concerns about
the deleterious effects of the panel ruling on Congress’ policies set forth
in 47 U.S.C. § 230, a law that plays a crucial role in the Internet’s
success.
This brief of amici curiae is submitted on behalf of the following
persons, all of whom are Internet Law teachers or scholars (affiliations
are for identification only):
• Professor David S. Ardia, University of North Carolina School of
Law
• Professor Irene Calboli, Marquette University Law School
• Professor Brian L. Frye, University of Kentucky College of Law
• Professor Margot Kaminski, The Ohio State University Michael E.
Moritz College of Law
• Professor Marshall Leaffer, Indiana University, Maurer School of
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Law
• Professor David S. Levine, Elon University School of Law
• Professor Brian Love, Santa Clara University School of Law
• Professor Phil Malone, Stanford Law School
• Professor Ira Steven Nathenson, St. Thomas University School of
Law (Florida)
• Professor Connie Davis Nichols, Baylor School of Law
• Professor Matthew Sag, Loyola University Chicago School of Law
• Professor Michael D. Scott, Southwestern Law School
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STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 29(c)(5)
No party’s counsel authored the brief in whole or in part; no party
or party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund
preparing or submitting the brief; and no person or entity contributed
money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.
Dated: November 25, 2014
By: s/ Venkat Balasubramani
Counsel for Amici Curiae
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case is nominally about copyright law, but the case has
significant implications for 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”), an
important federal law that wasn’t referenced in the panel ruling.
Section 230 categorically eliminates website liability for many types of
third-party content, and it usually requires an aggrieved plaintiff to
proceed against the speaker rather than against any intermediary. Due
to the robust nature of the immunity, Section 230 provides the legal
foundation for many of the most popular websites that enable users to
communicate with each other or the world at large. Though the panel
ruling didn’t directly interpret Section 230’s immunity, the panel’s
broad interpretation of copyright law nevertheless harms the immunity
by helping plaintiffs bypass it. The de facto narrowing of Section 230
immunity, in turn, poses significant risks for websites of all sizes and
types. To avoid that outcome, the Court should affirm the district
court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.
ARGUMENT
I.

Section 230 Advances Important Social Goals
Section 230 mandates that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
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computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). As this Court has explained:
Congress granted most Internet services immunity from
liability for publishing false or defamatory material so long
as the information was provided by another party. As a
result, Internet publishers are treated differently from
corresponding publishers in print, television and radio.
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
Congress enacted Section 230 more than 15 years ago in part to
“promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media.” 47 U.S.C. §
230(b)(1).
This immunity has succeeded in that goal. Just as Congress
intended, Section 230 provides the legal foundation for the modern
Internet. For example, twelve of the top thirteen sites in the United
States, as measured by Alexa, depend on third-party content—and
Section 230.1 See Top Sites in United States, Alexa.com, available at:
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

The sites are (in order) Google.com, Facebook.com, YouTube.com,
Amazon.com, Yahoo.com, Wikipedia.org, Twitter.com, eBay.com,
Reddit.com, LinkedIn.com, Go.com, Craigslist.org and Imgur.com."
1
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http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/US. Section 230’s immunity
facilitates most of the key functions of the Internet: email, hosting of
users’ content, search, social networking, shopping in marketplaces, and
much more.
Congress also specifically intended Section 230 to minimize
barriers to entry in the Internet industry. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
Congress has succeeded with that goal as well. Countless start-ups rely
on Section 230 when deciding to enter the market.
Rulings that undermine Section 230’s immunity pose serious risks
to the important Internet functions we enjoy every day. Indeed, this
Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of preserving Section
230’s immunity. For example, the Court observed in Roommates.com:
We must keep firmly in mind that this is an immunity
statute we are expounding, a provision enacted to protect
websites against the evil of liability for failure to remove
offensive content….[C]lose cases, we believe, must be resolved
in favor of immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230
by forcing websites to face death by ten thousand duckbites…
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Kozinski, C.J.) (emphasis
added).
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Garcia’s Copyright Claim is Designed to Bypass Section
230’s Immunity
In her original complaint against Nakoula and YouTube, Garcia

did not allege a copyright claim. Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula,
BC492358 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 19, 2012), available at:
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1688&con
text=historical. Instead, she initially alleged defamation, publicity and
privacy rights violations, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and related tort claims. Garcia’s initial choice of claims is
understandable in light of Nakoula’s alleged deception of Garcia; and
her decision not to pursue a copyright claim initially was logical given
the legal hurdles it faced.
However, none of Garcia’s initial claims would provide the relief
she sought (and obtained) against YouTube in this case: an order
requiring that all copies of the video be taken down. Section 230
unambiguously preempts all of those claims against YouTube when, as
here, a third party uploaded the video. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570
F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009) (“what matters is not the name of the
cause of action—defamation versus negligence versus intentional
infliction of emotional distress—what matters is whether the cause of
7



      

action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the
‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another”). Section 230’s
immunity applies even if Garcia waived all damages claims and only
sought an injunction against YouTube. IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE &
INTERNET LAW TREATISE WITH FORMS (2d ed. 2013), § 37.05[8]. Even if a
court enjoined the video publisher (Nakoula) from further publication of
the video, the injunction wouldn’t apply to YouTube. Blockowicz v.
Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 2010).
Faced with the insurmountable hurdle of Section 230 immunity
for her most pertinent claims, Garcia understandably sought to assert a
legal claim against YouTube that would bypass Section 230. Section 230
has limited statutory exclusions, but it does exclude intellectual
property claims. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1). As a practical matter, the only
legal tool Garcia could use that might yield a remedy against YouTube
is a federal copyright claim.2

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

Section 230 precludes any claims based on state intellectual property
laws. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. ccBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir.
2007) (Section 230’s carveout of “immunity from ‘law[s] pertaining to
intellectual property’” does not include state intellectual property law).
Thus, if Garcia had asserted IP claims against YouTube based on state
2
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In other words, this lawsuit initially sought to vindicate harms
putatively protected by defamation and privacy law, but it converted
into a copyright battle only because Congress’ broad grant of immunity
in Section 230 requires courts to reject all non-IP claims against usergenerated content websites like YouTube. Thus, a ruling accepting the
merits of Garcia’s copyright claim and requiring YouTube to remove the
content in question—a result that Garcia could not achieve through her
initial state law claims—would have substantial implications for other
plaintiffs who similarly want to bypass Congress’ immunity for
intermediaries.
III. Plaintiffs are Routinely Creating New Ways to Use
Copyright Law to Undermine the Section 230 Immunity
Garcia is not the only plaintiff who has spotted the copyright
“hole” in Section 230’s otherwise-unassailable immunity. In recent
years, numerous other litigants have tried different copyright-based
workarounds, all seeking to force intermediaries to remove content
otherwise protected by the Section 230 immunity. Examples of
litigation involving attempts by plaintiffs to use copyright as a
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

law, such as state copyright or publicity rights, Section 230 would
clearly preempt those claims."
9



      

workaround to Section 230 include the following scenarios:3
A. Prospective Copyright Assignments of Consumer Reviews: If a
patient posts a negative review of a doctor to a review website like Yelp,
Section 230 limits the review website’s legal obligation to remove the
post. To get around this hurdle, some doctors made their patients sign
contracts prospectively assigning the copyrights to the patients’ future
online reviews of the doctor. See Lee v. Makhnevich, 11 Civ. 8665 (PAC),
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43760 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2013) (rejecting
defendants’ motion to dismiss in a case where dentist-defendants made
patients sign a confidentiality agreement, “as a precondition of
treatment,” that purported to assign to defendants a copyright over
“any comments created or made by patients about defendants”); see also
Graeme McMillan, Doctors Now Using Breach of Copyright to Quash
Bad Online Reviews, TIME TECHLAND BLOG (Apr. 14, 2011) (“patients
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

These are just a sample of litigated cases where plaintiffs have tried to
use copyright to remove content from intermediaries. Even journalistic
entities and politicians—groups who would presumably think twice
about trying to suppress commentary—have engaged in this practice.
See, e.g., Kristin Bergman, After On-Air Mishaps, Embarrassed
Newscasters Turn to Copyright Law, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Aug.
13, 2013), available at: http://www.dmlp.org/blog/2013/after-airmishaps-embarrassed-newscasters-turn-copyright-law)."
3

10



     

sign away their review copyright to their doctors in the middle of all the
other paperwork they have to fill in, allowing doctors to then go to
review sites and demand the bad reviews be taken down because they’re
in breach of copyright”), available at:
http://techland.time.com/2011/04/14/how-do-doctors-avoid-bad-onlinereviews-legally/. Armed with these prospective but legally-questionable
copyright assignments, doctors can choose which patient reviews they
want taken down and use the threat of copyright infringement litigation
to selectively scrub those reviews from the Internet.
The abuse of copyright assignments to suppress consumer reviews
has become so problematic that a pending Congressional bill proposes to
ban it. Consumer Review Freedom Act of 2014, H.R. 5499 §2(a)(3)
(introduced Sept. 16, 2014).
B. Post-Publication Copyright Acquisition to Remove Truthful
Depictions: People who don’t like how they are depicted in a truthful
photo or video published online can seek to acquire the copyright (postpublication) to that photo or video. Once they acquire the copyright,
they can then use their copyright ownership status to force usergenerated content websites to remove the truthful content, even though
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any other legal claim against the website would fail due to Section 230.
For example, in Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., 10 Civ. 9538
(PKC) (RLE), 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1725, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64202, *2
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), a student took a video of a male student punching a
woman in his class and then posted the video online. The male acquired
the copyright to the video and then used that copyright interest to
attempt to get the video off the Internet. Similarly, in Katz v.
Chevaldina, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2012), a blogger
displayed a photograph of the plaintiff’s face in connection with blog
posts critical of the plaintiff. The plaintiff acquired ownership of the
photograph and then sued the blogger for copyright infringement.
In both cases, the plaintiffs’ goal was to suppress truthful
depictions of them. In both cases, Section 230 would have provided an
airtight immunity for intermediaries against the plaintiffs’ efforts to
erase these accurate depictions. And in both cases, by acquiring the
copyright to the depiction, the plaintiffs could work around Section
230’s immunity to undercut Congress’ intent in Section 230.
The panel majority’s opinion can be read to negate the need for
plaintiffs like Scott and Katz to acquire the depiction’s copyright post-
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publication. Arguably, the ruling creates the possibility that both Scott
and Katz already owned sufficient copyright interests in the depictions
to exercise takedown power over the content in question. If so, it is clear
that future plaintiffs in this position will embrace that copyright
interest to scrub truthful depictions of them from the Internet.
C. Default Judgment Transfer of Copyright: In a variation of these
themes, a business owner unhappy with an online review sued the
review author, procured a default judgment, had the court order the
transfer of the copyright to the review as a remedy, and is now suing
the review website for copyright infringement. Small Justice LLC, et al.
v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 13-cv-11701, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38602 (D.
Mass. Mar. 24, 2014) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss copyright
claim based on copyright in consumer review acquired via default
judgment in state court). The state court’s copyright transfer almost
certainly violates 17 U.S.C. § 201(e), but because the court ordered the
transfer in a default proceeding, no one contested it at the time. As a
result, the court armed the plaintiff with a powerful copyright tool to
attack a review that was otherwise immunized by Section 230.
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The Panel Ruling Enables More Copyright Workarounds to
an Important Immunity
As the above examples illustrate, plaintiffs are aggressively

looking for ways to use copyright law to suppress the publication of
content (whether false or truthful) about them that they don’t like—an
outcome copyright law wasn’t designed to achieve. See Rebecca
Tushnet, How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2346
(2014), available at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1323.
As evidenced by the controversy around the panel ruling and the
Copyright Office’s rejection of Garcia’s copyright registration, the panel
majority took an expansive view of the scope of copyright ownership. To
the extent the majority’s view expanded copyright law, it effects a
corresponding decrease in the scope of Section 230 immunity. At
minimum, by giving a stamp of approval on the use of copyright to take
down content that would otherwise fall within Section 230’s immunity,
the panel ruling exacerbates the trend of plaintiffs using copyright as a
workaround to Section 230. The Court should reject this approach.
As the ability of plaintiffs to claim copyright ownership expands, it
increasingly upsets the immunity’s framework intended by Congress.
This Court has said that via Section 230, Congress “sought to prevent
14



      

lawsuits from shutting down websites and other services on the
Internet.” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003); and the
Court has also noted that “§ 230(c) provides broad immunity for
publishing content provided primarily by third parties.” Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). The
injunction entered by the panel majority encourages copyright claims as
a proxy for state law tort claims against user-generated content
websites, and in turn it undermines these important objectives.
CONCLUSION
On its face, Garcia’s case is not about the “right to forget”
historical truths, attempts to squelch political criticism, or attempts to
scrub unflattering but protected commentary from review sites.
Nevertheless, the legal arguments raised by Garcia in this case are
virtually identical to the arguments made by plaintiffs who want to
suppress the publication of truthful information about them in other
contexts. Plaintiffs are already trying to turn copyright into a generalpurpose tool to scrub truthful content, thwarting Congress’ intent in
enacting Section 230’s immunity. By providing additional copyright
leverage to plaintiffs who want to erase the truth, the panel ruling
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tacitly expanded the IP exception to Section 230’s immunity while
narrowing the scope of that immunity. The Court should reject this
approach. Instead, the Court should affirm the district court’s
conclusion that Garcia is unlikely to succeed on the merits and the
denial of Garcia’s request for a preliminary injunction.

Dated: November 25, 2014

Respectfully submitted,
By: s/ Eric Goldman
s/ Venkat Balasubramani
Counsel for Amici Curiae
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